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FOURTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE COMMON LAW
DEFINITION OF "MALICIOUSLY" DOES NOT APPLY IN
THE CONTEXT OF 18 U.S.C.A. § 35-UNITED STATES
V. HASSOUNEH, 199 F.3D 175 (4TH CIR. 2000)
SHAHNAZ PANCHBHAYA
T HE FOURTH CIRCUIT reviews jury instructions subject to
an abuse of discretion standard.1 When reviewing the ade-
quacy of such jury instructions, the Fourth Circuit follows Teague
v. Bakke? and will not reverse jury instructions as long as the
controlling law is properly stated.' In United States v. Hassouneh,4
the Fourth Circuit held that the district court's jury instruction
that defined the word "maliciously" did not state the controlling
law.5 The district court defined "maliciously" in accordance with
the common law as an act "committed intentionally or with will-
ful disregard of the likelihood that damage or injury would re-
sult."6 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit found that the common
law definition did not suffice and that "maliciously" included
some type of evil intent in its definition.7 This fact is important
because the circuit court successfully established that using the
word "maliciously" distinguished one penalty from the other'
when examining two different penalties under 18 U.S.C.A. § 35
assessed to those who convey false information about placing de-
structive devices aboard a civil aircraft.' Although the court did
I See United States v. Hassouneh, 199 F.3d 175, 181 (4th Cir. 2000). In United
States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit reviewedjury
instructions relating to a criminal case under an abuse of discretion standard.
2 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994).
3 See id. at 985 (explaining that the district court will be given discretion and
jury instructions will not be reversed as long as they "adequately state the control-
ling law").
4 199 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2000).
5 Id. at 182.
6 Id. at 181.
7 Id. at 182
8 See id.
9 See id. at 179.
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not arrive at its own definition of the word "maliciously," this
holding exemplifies the analysis necessary in examining whether
the use of a common law definition would best fit in context of a
penalty assessed, or whether another definition should be
created.
On Saturday, November 15, 1997, Mahmoud Hassouneh was
scheduled to take a flight from North Carolina to Orlando, Flor-
ida on AirTran Airways."' Upon his arrival at the AirTran ticket
counter, an airline employee asked him if any unknown person
had asked him to carry anything on board the aircraft. 1 Has-
souneh responded that two men had given him a bomb to
carry.1 2 The airline employee escorted Hassouneh to a security
area to have his bag examined. 3
Hassouneh's bag was run through the x-ray machine, thor-
oughly examined, and eventually destroyed by a bomb special-
ist.14 Later inspection showed that Hassouneh's bag did not
have a bomb or any explosives in it.'5 A police officer ques-
tioned Hassouneh, who claimed to have been joking about the
bomb.'6
The government had two options. It could have filed suit
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) that states:
Whoever imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or con-
veyed false information, knowing the information to be false,
concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be
made, to do any act which would be a crime prohibited by this
chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title shall be subject
to a civil penalty of not more than $1000 which shall be recover-
able in a civil action brought in the name of the United States.
But instead it filed suit against Hassouneh under the felony pro-
vision 18 U.S.C.A. § 35(b), which states:
Whoever willfully and maliciously, or with reckless disregard for
the safety of human life, imparts or conveys or causes to be im-
parted or conveyed false information, knowing the information
to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being
made or to be made, to do any act which would be a crime pro-
hibited by this chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title-






16 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 177.
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shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
1 7
Hassouneh was tried in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina.' 8
During open court proceedings, Hassouneh indicated that his
comment involving the bomb in the bag was a joke and asked to
bring in character evidence showing that he was known for be-
ing a jokester. The court denied the request, ruling that such
evidence was irrelevant because being a jokester was not a de-
fense to the crime.' 9 The district court instructed the jury that
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 35(b), the government must prove that
Hassouneh acted willfully and maliciously."' Hassouneh was
found guilty under 18 U.S.C.A. § 35(b),2 ' and he subsequently
appealed, claiming that the district court had erred in in-
structing the jury on the meaning of the word "maliciously." 22
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Hassouneh, vacated his convic-
tion and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.23
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Williams24 reviewed
the jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard,25 as
proscribed by Teague v. Bakker,26 holding that jury instructions
would not be reversed as long as the controlling law was stated.27
Hence, the Fourth Circuit needed to determine whether the dis-
trict court had improperly instructed the jury on the meaning of
the word "maliciously. 28
According to the court of appeals, the jury instruction on the
word "maliciously" failed to meet the Teague standard.2 9 The
court found that the district court borrowed only a part of the
Eighth Circuit's definition of "maliciously" in United States v.
Sweet, omitting the "intent to vex, annoy, or injure another or an
'7 18 U.S.C.A. § 35(a) (West 2000).
18 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 175.
'g Id. at 178.
20 Id
21 Id. at 179.
22 Id. at 176.
23 Id.
24 Judges Wilkins and Butzner joined Judge Williams' opinion. See United
States v. Hassouneh, No. 98-4401, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 427, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan.
13, 2000).
25 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 181.
26 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994).
27 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 181.
28 Id. at 181-82.
29 Id. at 182.
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intent to do a wrongful act" portion."' The court further deter-
mined that Congress intended a different meaning of the word
"maliciously" from its common law definition because of its two
separate penalties.3' Finally, the court concluded that Has-
souneh's proposed definition of "maliciously" more accurately
reflected the legal standard necessary to convict a person under
18 U.S.C.A. § 35(b) because it included an evil motive.32
The Fourth Circuit correctly remanded this case based on the
district court's erroneous definition of the word "maliciously."3"
The court did not prohibit the use of citing the Sweet court's
definition of "maliciously," 4 but recognized the need to adopt
another meaning in this particular context. The court assumed
that Congress intended the term "maliciously" to mean an act
"with an evil purpose or motive. ''3 By exploring the evolution
of § 35 over time, " in order to decipher Congress' intent for
having two separate penalties under this section, the court
demonstrated that each penalty required concise meanings in
its assessment to avoid redundancy between the two penalties.
0 Id. at 181. In United States v. Sweet, 985 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1993), the
Eighth Circuit reviewed the definition of "maliciously" as used in § 35(b).
Id. at 182.
32 Id.
' Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 184.
14 In United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit
adopted Sweet's definition of the word "maliciously" since Congress did not de-
fine the word in Title 18, U.S.C., Section 844(i)-the statute that the defendant
allegedly violated.
35 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 181.
36 Congress clearly intended a different definition of "maliciously" as evi-
denced by the evolution of 18 U.S.C.A. § 35. See Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 179-81.
Before 1961, 18 U.S.C.A. § 35 (known as the "Bomb Hoax Act") did not have two
parts as it does now. The original provision stated,
Whoever willfully imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or
conveyed false information, knowing the information to be false,
concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be
made, to do any act which would be a crime prohibited by this
chapter or chapter 97, or chapter 111 of this title-shall be fined
not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.
See, e.g., United States v. White, 475 F.2d 1228, 1231 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting
18 U.S.C.A, § 35 in its 1956 form). In 1961, Congress added subsection (b) to
section 35 and removed the word "willfully" from the 1956 version, which is now
subsection (a). See Hassounch, 199 F.3d at 180. "These changes clearly indicate a
congressional intent to subject anyone who provides false information of the type
proscribed in the statute to punishment, but to punish those who make such
statements 'willfully and maliciously, or with reckless disregard for the safety of
human life' more severely." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 35(b)).
18 U.S.C.A. § 35
The Fourth Circuit's approach was precise in that the court
justified its assumption of Congress' intent of the definition of
"maliciously. ' 3' The court established that if "maliciously"
meant "intentionally," then § 35 (a) and § 35 (b) would be identi-
cal and the need for both penalties would be unnecessary. 8 As
the court acknowledged, one must act intentionally to commit
either penalty under § 35. 9 Therefore, it was necessary for the
court to adhere to a more meticulous definition of "mali-
ciously," which more accurately reflected the intention of
§ 35(b).
Hassouneh had presented a jury instruction to the district
court defining the word "maliciously." '' Given the Fourth Cir-
cuit's assumptions of Congress' intent, Hassouneh's definition
of "maliciously" would have been considered more reliable and
accurate. Had Hassouneh's definition been applied, he might
have been subject only to a civil penalty under § 35(a) rather
than the felony provision under which he was tried.4
Judge Williams also addressed the definition of the word "will-
fully" as used in the district court's jury instructions.42 Has-
souneh's requested definition of "willfully" was practically
identical to the one proposed by the district court." Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's definition, holding
that the definition of "willfully" did not have an evil purpose
requirement, as Hassouneh suggested Congress had intended it
to include.44
The Fourth Circuit also reviewed the district court's decision
to prohibit Hassouneh from presenting evidence in relation to
his character." Hassouneh's reputation was indeed relevant evi-
37 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 182.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 178 n.4.
41 See id. at 181 (explaining that section 35 allows jokers who make false state-
ments prohibited by this statute to be subject to a civil penalty under subsection
(a) rather than a felony under subsection (b)).
42 The district court defined "willfully" as "deliberately and intentionally, as
contrasted with being made accidentally, carelessly or unintentionally." Id. at
183.
43 Hassouneh defined "willfully" as "voluntarily and intentionally." Hassouneh,
199 F.3d at 183.
44 Id. (holding that the district court was not in error when it omitted the "evil
purpose" component from its definition of "willfully").
45 Id. at 182-83.
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dence of his character, and the court ordered this evidence to
be presented on remand.46
The court in Hassouneh offers the Fourth Circuit's first look at
a suitable definition of the word "maliciously" as used in
§ 35(b).47 This court's precedent will require other courts to
note which jury instructions will be more appropriate when con-
sidering the meaning of the word "maliciously." In addition,
many other words defined in jury instructions will be given spe-
cial attention where the definitions of these words could poten-
tially alter a conviction from that of a greater offense to a lesser
one. As a result, more carefully written jury instructions should
result in circuit courts giving greater deference to the lower
courts.
As Hassouneh illustrates, Congress intended to distinguish the
word "maliciously" in § 35(b) .4 The district court might have
considered the common law definition of "maliciously" when in-
structing the jury.49 However, the common law definition of a
particular word may not always apply in certain contexts, as this
case illustrates.' As a result of this case, § 35(b) is more likely
to be accurately construed when the word "maliciously" is ap-
plied. In the pursuit of a more efficient court system, steps
should be taken at lower levels to ensure that the ambiguity ex-
isting among many words used in jury instructions are clearly
defined in accordance with the particular statute being applied.
46 Id. at 183 (finding the denial of Hassouneh's reputation to be an abuse of
discretion).
47 Id. at 181 n.8 (explaining that only the Eighth Circuit has contemplated the
word "maliciously" as used in section 35).
48 Id. at 182 (explaining that by inserting the word "maliciously" in subsection
(b) of section 35, Congress intended to distinguish it from subsection (a) of sec-
tion 35).
49 Hassouneh, 199 F.3d at 181 (finding that the district court might have used
its definition of "maliciously" from Sweet).
5o The common law definition of "maliciously" is consistent with the definition
used in Sweet. See id. at 182. However, the Fourth Circuit opted to follow Gullet's
reasoning in not adopting the common law definition of a word if it was obvious
that Congress wanted the word to mean something else. See id.
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